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Dispute between Russia and Ukraine settled? –
Strategies for the European Union to get out of the gas trap
The public, by now, perceives the gas dispute be-
tween Russia and Ukraine as an annual event. At a
time when temperatures in the whole of Europe sel-
domly reach more than zero degrees Celsius the
clash between the Russian gas company Gazprom
and its Ukrainian counterpart Naftogaz directly
affects the European Union and South East Euro-
pean countries. Bulgaria and Slovakia, for example,
had to shut down public facilities, like schools,
because they are no longer able to heat them. Both
countries are thinking about reactivating their
nuclear power plants that they recently had to shut
off in order to fulfil the conditions of EU member-
ship. But also non-EU member
states like Bosnia-Herzegovina
or Serbia suffer from the lack of
gas. Families from cities move
to their relatives in the country-
side because they use coal heat-
ers. As a consequence, those
countries are beginning to suf-
fer from a shortage of coal as
well. Meanwhile the debate on the dependency on
Gazprom and its rigid business practices is once
again emotionally discussed in the Western media.
The dispute has an economic and political
dimension
Almost 80 percent of the Russian gas deliveries to
Europe flow through Ukrainian territory. Further-
more, about 75 percent of the Ukrainian gas imports
come either from Russia or from Central Asia, which
is in turn supplied through Russia. Despite its own
gas production, which amounts to not more than 30
percent, Ukraine is highly dependent on Russia. The
energy supply of Europe is therefore dependent on
bilateral and even multilateral relations and there-
fore subject to international politics. Although the
issue has become highly politicized, it started as an
economic dispute between Gazprom and Naftogaz
when the Russian company demanded an immedi-
ate settlement of the debts in November 2008. It
would be wrong to assume that the gas dispute has
only escalated due to the intentions of the Russian
administration to overthrow the current government
of Ukraine or to punish it for its ambition to become
a NATO member. One of Gazprom’s interests as a
company is – and has to be – to sell its products to
market prices. When it comes
to the analysis of the crisis, the
economic dimension should
therefore not be neglected.
In every country of the former
Soviet Union the prices for
natural gas from Russia are
below the market value. This
allows the countries a softer transition to market
prices, but it also enables Russia to use the energy
supplies as an instrument to gain influence on the
countries in its neighbourhood. While all other
natural resources are traded at fair market value be-
tween the Russian Federation and Ukraine, gas
remains the last resource to receive this intranspar-
ent subvention. By selling subsidised gas to Ukraine,
Gazprom had lost revenues of approximately $12
billion in 2008 compared to the prices for the
European trade partners. Although Gazprom is gra-
dually reducing the – to some extent extreme –
divergence between the value of the gas delivered
and the price paid for it in the post-Soviet states,
“Cheap gas prices allow the
countries of the former Soviet Union
a softer transition to market prices
but also enable Russia to use the
energy supplies as an instrument to
gain influence on the countries in its
neighbourhood. ”
Readers of the headlines that recently made it to Russian newspapers described them with the following play of
words: It was either the “sektor Gaza” (the Gaza Strip) or the “sektor bez gaza” (the region without gas). At least
the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine seems to be solved for the moment, after Russian prime minister
Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko have agreed on a solution on January 18. The
event has once again pushed the diversification of energy supply in the European Union to the top of the agen-
da. However, there is more to be done. The EU should use its influence on the Ukrainian government to help it
reduce its own demand of natural gas and assist it at improving its energy infrastructure.
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this process is undergone in different paces and to
different conditions. But these do not necessarily
reflect the relations between the Kremlin and the
respective governments. In December 2006, the
dispute between Russia and Belarus on gas prices
and transit fees led to a temporal termination of the
Druzhba-pipeline, the world’s longest oil pipeline,
which supplies around 20 percent of Germany’s oil.
Ironically, the translation of the pipeline’s name is
“friendship”, reflecting the good political relations
between Moscow and Minsk. However, even in this
case, the economic interest was more relevant than
the friendship between former Russian president
Vladimir Putin and his Belarusian counterpart,
Alexander Lukashenko.
Besides Belarus, Armenia is the
country among the former
Soviet republics that pays the
lowest price for Russian gas.
The price is fixed at $119,
respectively $110 per 1000
cubic meters (cbm), and in
return Gazprom is having a
stake in their national gas net.
A similar model was offered to
Ukraine, which, however, declined to sell its gas net
to Gazprom. In turn the gas price for Ukraine has
gradually been increased from $50 in 2005 to $179.50
in 2008. Naftogaz rejected the offer of $250 for the
current year and was only willing to pay a maximum
of $235, a price it is most likely not able to pay either.
For the tattered Ukrainian economy, the price of
$179.50 has already been too high. In the course of
the dispute Alexey Miller, CEO of Gazprom, offered
to Naftogaz a price of $450, which is above the price
that Western Europe pays with about $418, and far
above the expected market price for 2009 that will,
according to experts, range between $260 and $300.
The gas price is connected to the oil price, and since
the global financial crisis led to a rapid decline of the
price per barrel oil that temporarily went below $50,
the gas price is also going to drop.
Intransparent Middlemen and inefficient use of
energy
Another problem related to the gas dispute between
Gazprom and Naftogaz is the interconnected
Ukrainian middleman. The current company is
RosUkrEnergo (RUE). Similar to its predecessors
Itera and EuralTransGaz (ETG), RUE did not have to
apply for this profitable position. Ukraine pays RUE
with around 20 percent of the total delivered gas in
kind, having received $4.35 billion worth of gas in
2007, assuming an average gas price of about $300
per 1000 cbm. Officials of the Russian and Ukrainian
gas industry are directly profiting from this bargain.
Outsiders can neither reconstruct who is responsible
for these deals, nor how the actual gas price and
transit fees come about. The unclear responsibilities
lead to the chronic underinvestment in the infra-
structure of the gas sector in Ukraine. As a result, a
gas pipeline near Kiev exploded due to a lack of
maintenance in May 2007.
In addition to this problem, there is a disproportion-
ate use of natural gas in Ukraine in relation to its
economy. Having an economy the size of the Czech
Republic’s, Ukraine uses as
much gas as the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary
and Poland together. That
makes Ukraine the sixth big-
gest consumer of natural gas in
the world. Reasons for this are
the cheap gas price that
Ukraine offers to the consum-
ers at home and the inefficient
use of energy. Thermal isolation is still the exception
in Ukrainian households.
Homemade problems in Ukraine
Ukraine has manoeuvred itself into a difficult posi-
tion lately. Naftogaz knew that the gas contract with
Gazprom would run out at the end of 2008, but 
failed to take early actions. The debts of about $2 bil-
lion dollars have not completely been amortised.
Shortly before the end of December 2008, Ukraine
paid $1.5 billion to Gazprom. The Russian company
considers the outstanding $0.5 billion a penalty for
failure of payment by Naftogaz. This was one of the
initial arguments between both parties, as mentio-
ned above. Moreover, Ukraine was accused of sipho-
ning off gas from the deliveries to Western Europe.
According to Gazprom and a Swiss monitoring
company, something similar had happened during
the last gas dispute in 2006. Even though Ukraine
uses its own gas and the cheaper gas from Turk-
menistan to supply its population, delivery bottle-
necks force Ukraine from time to time to use
Gazprom’s gas and therefore debts are increasing.
The alleged siphoning led to the termination of all
gas deliveries to Ukraine, and consequently to
Western Europe, by Gazprom.
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“There is a disproportionate use of
natural gas in Ukraine in relation
to its economy. Having an economy
the size of the Czech Republic’s,
Ukraine uses as much gas as the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary
and Poland together.”
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Naftogaz is also to blame for the repeated shut-
down by Gazprom. A certain amount of gas is need-
ed in order to be able to keep a pipeline running.
According to Naftogaz, Gazprom should provide
this so-called transitional gas. Gazprom’s stand-
point, however, is that Naftogaz should buy the
transitional gas, which was declined by Naftogaz.
The political relations between the Russian admini-
stration and their Ukrainian counterparts have been
strained since the Orange Revolution in 2004.
However, not even the best friends would make
deals between their companies about the delivery of
a product without a contract and with a price to be
fixed in the future. This is particularly not the case
when the buying company
additionally has debts with the
company that is selling the
product.
At the end of the day Gazprom
simply needs to ensure its prof-
its, and therefore has a strong interest in getting
paid for its gas. It wants to get paid for the debts by
Ukraine, get paid for gas deliveries to Ukraine at a
fair market price, and get paid by Western Europe.
Because no gas flew through Ukraine to Europe
Gazprom lost around $120 million every day. With
respect to market prices in decline and the global
financial crisis, Gazprom cannot afford to set re-
venues aside as well; it was therefore also interested
in finally settling the dispute.
The role of the European Union
The current Czech presidency was able to mediate
an agreement between Russia and Ukraine on the
deployment of a monitoring mission in order to con-
trol the gas pipelines that cross Ukraine. Although
some commentators have criticized that the EU
negotiators were not able to apply more pressure on
Russia and Ukraine to overcome the conflict faster, it
should not be forgotten that the mediation between
both countries was a rather difficult task. The debate
between Kiev and Moscow was also about the “mul-
tilateral” composition of the mission. Ukraine rejec-
ted the idea of representatives of Gazprom as parti-
cipants in the mission and wanted monitors only
from the European Commission. While the EU
monitors were already on the ground in Ukraine,
Russia insisted that the inclusion of Russian officials
in the mission was a prerequisite to restore the gas
supplies. Just as problematic was the fact that the
agreement had to be signed again by both parties
after the one-handed addition of annexes by
Ukraine, declaring that Naftogaz has no debts with
Gazprom. In the end, the mediated agreement was a
compromise and allowed the Ukrainian, Russian,
and European observers in the mission to enter
Russian and Ukrainian territory. Although the moni-
toring mission never started its work, the EU never-
theless achieved both parties continuing the nego-
tiations and finally reaching a breakthrough.
While many observers in the run-up to the presi-
dency did not have much confidence in the Czech
government, it did a fairly good job in the mediation
process between Russia and Ukraine. The liberal
prime minister Mirek Topolanek
and his government showed a
good understanding of Russian
problems and proved to be fast
and good EU negotiators. It is
also said that the German chan-
cellor Angela Merkel played a
crucial role in the mediation behind the scenes. Both
conflicting parties perceived the EU as a neutral
mediator. Thus, the issue was also an opportunity to
put Europe’s strained relations with Moscow back
on course.
Ways out of the gas trap
In order not only to be able to strengthen its role
towards the Russian Federation but also to prevent
any future gas shortage in Western Europe, the EU
should take the following steps:
1. As a short-term goal the EU needs to agree on
effective mechanisms to prevent the total shut-
down of gas supplies through Ukraine in the future.
One possibility would be to use its influence on the
Ukrainian government to help it mediate conflicts
with Russia before they escalate.
2. By helping to build confidence between Ukraine
and Russia, the EU also improves its relations with
Russia. Energy security issues need to be addressed
in the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
(PCA) between both parties. Legal regulations will
not only prevent Europe from freezing but also help
Russia to restore confidence in being a reliable ener-
gy supplier.
3. The EU should assist Ukraine in its efforts to guar-
antee the functioning of its gas net. One possibility
would be to create an international consortium,
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“Both conflicting parties perceived
the EU as a neutral mediator. Thus,
the issue was also an opportunity to
put Europe’s strained relations with
Moscow back on course.”
which would rent the Ukrainian gas infrastructure.
This would relieve Ukraine of the burden to invest in
the infrastructure.
4. Ukraine also needs assistance in order to establish
a more efficient energy infrastructure. Being the
sixth largest consumer of natural gas in the world,
Ukraine furthermore needs to diversify its energy
sources. However, this should not solely be achieved
by focusing on nuclear and coal power, as it is pro-
posed in the Ukrainian energy strategy. The EU must
now get more active in assisting Ukraine to invest in
alternative energy sources as well. This is an issue
Ukraine would have to address in the future anyway
if it wants to achieve EU membership one day.
5. However, not only Ukraine but also the EU itself
needs to continue to search for alternative sources of
energy. Only combined efforts of all member states
will be successful and sustainable in this respect.
Therefore the call for an integrated energy policy has
to be iterated. National efforts once again stood out
to be inefficient and insufficient. The EU has to
ensure that its energy networks are better integrated
and inter-connected, and should strengthen the
internal market in gas and electricity.
6. Furthermore, the establishment of alternative routes
of energy are certainly another way of preventing
the shortage of gas supply in Western Europe. In
addition to the construction of alternative routes
from Russia, like the North and South Stream pipe-
lines, the EU should particularly focus on alternative
energy routes from third countries in order to reduce
its dependency on Gazprom. The Nabucco pipeline
from the Caucasus should become the top priority,
while at the same time thinking of additional
options, for example the promotion of liquid natural
gas (LNG).
The Czech government, which has formulated ener-
gy as one of the priorities during its presidency, has
now a good reason to continue its efforts in this
policy field. Not all of these recommendations can
be implemented in such a short period of time.
However, the Czech presidency should try using this
opportunity to take the first steps on the way out of
the gas trap. Progress in the sektor bez gaza was
definitely easier to achieve as in the sektor Gaza. In
the end, many commentators might be surprised by
the successes of the Czech presidency.
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